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THE MOTIVES, &c.

IN a free country, where the people claim the privilege of delivering their opinion of the meaſures adopted by the adminiſtrators of their government without reſtraint, it is natural, when a war is either actually engaged in, or only in agitation, that they ſhould indulge that privilege in an extraordinary degree; that they ſhould weigh the objects of contention in the balance of what they preſume to be the national intereſt, and proportion the degree of their cenſure or applauſe as the ſcale, not always of reaſon, but too frequently of perſonal and temporary convenience, apparently preponderates.

The attention of the public has certainly never been more generally attracted than by the peculiar circumſtances attending the preſent war with France. The expediency of the meaſure

meaſure has been debated with unuſual warmth in our ſenate. The conduct of his Majeſty's miniſters has been alternately extolled and condemned. Specious have been oppoſed to ſolid arguments; and, although the general voice of the nation has approved their exertions, the vanquiſhed party of oppoſition, reduced as it is by the deſertion of many of its moſt reſpectable adherents, ſtill returns with confidence to the field of combat; whilſt thoſe, who are immediately entruſted with the affairs of government, conſcious of the integrity of their intentions, meet with unprecedented firmneſs the invectives of their antagoniſts, and do not diſdain to profit from the truths which occaſionally roll down with the torrent of their eloquence.

At ſo important a criſis, when the moſt diſtinguiſhed talents, of which this or perhaps any other nation can boaſt, are employed in the defence or reprobation of the meaſures, which it has been thought expedient to adopt at the preſent juncture for the welfare of the country, it may wear the appearance of preſumption, in an obſcure individual, to obtrude his opinion on the public; but I venture, from a firm conviction that thoſe meaſures are entitled

tled to our confidence, and am willing to perform the part of a good citizen, by contributing to the utmoſt of my power to ſupport them.

To enter at large into a diſcuſſion of the cauſes, which produced the revolution in France, a revolution, which, like a tremendous earthquake, has ſhaken that unhappy country to its centre, thrown down every civil and religious inſtitution, burſt the bonds of ſociety aſunder, hurled the monarch from his throne, and deſtroyed the very altars ſacred to the Deity; which, in ſhort, has removed the moſt diſtant appearance of order, and left a dreadful maſs of ruin, ſtill convulſed and agitated by inteſtine tumult, would be to repeat not only from the journals of the day, but from a multitude of volumes, which have been already written on the ſubject, the hiſtory of tranſactions, at the very mention of which humanity recoils, and which we naturally wiſh to blot from our memory for ever.

To perform the taſk I have undertaken, it is only neceſſary to conſider the circumſtances as they actually exiſt, to place the principles maintained by the prevailing faction in France

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in their proper point of view, and ſeriouſly to examine the meaſures adopted by our government to counteract their fatal tendency.

It is univerſally acknowledged to be the duty of thoſe, who are appointed to guide the helm of the ſtate, to embrace every opportunity of promoting its welfare, to endeavour to foreſee, as far as human wiſdom will permit, probable events, to judge in what degree they are likely to affect its intereſts, to encourage ſuch as appear to have a beneficial tendency, and prevent the accompliſhment of thoſe which threaten it with danger. This duty appears never to have been fulfilled with more fidelity, or with greater zeal, than at the preſent period; a period, which, although the alarm has now happily ſubſided, has certainly been pregnant with the moſt ſerious evils that could poſſibly befall us; when anarchy approached with prodigious ſtrides, and a ſpirit of rebellion againſt *every* form of government, has been widely and induſtriouſly diffuſed, through innumerable channels, under the ſpecious appearance of a philoſophical diſquiſition, of wild and impracticable theories; when the meaneſt artifices have been, and I fear are ſtill, inſidiouſly employed, to ſeduce the ignorant and

and unwary from their allegiance to an amiable monarch and a well conſtituted government, and dark deſigns have threatened to invade our domeſtic tranquillity and happineſs.

When the ſun of liberty firſt appeared to ſhine in France, and ſhed its mild and enlivening beams on a people, which had groaned for ages in the chains of ſlavery, and the bleſſings we ourſelves enjoy promiſed to diffuſe their influence over that extenſive country, we rejoiced as men, as philoſophers, and Chriſtians. We vainly hoped that the bonds of deſpotiſm, which, like a rigorous froſt, had contracted, and rendered torpid, the minds of ſo many millions of inhabitants of a country, favoured by every gift that nature can beſtow, would be diſſolved; that the miſts of prejudice and national enmity would be diſperſed; and that, as mankind became more enlightened, it would be found to be their common intereſt to perpetuate the advantages of peace. We admitted an excuſe for a people, wanton and licentious in the enjoyment of their newly-acquired freedom; and even good men inclined, too much perhaps, to palliate their crimes. Hiſtory reminded us, that the Reformation, to which the proteſtant part of Europe is indebted for

its religious liberty, gave birth to a hoſt of extravagant fanatics, who trampled for a time on every divine and human obligation; we knew that the fertilizing waters of the Nile are productive of noxious vapours, and that the ſame ſhower, which nurtures the moſt wholeſome vegetables, and decorates the ſoil with flowers, quickens the growth of weeds, which frequently prevent their coming to maturity.

So aſtoniſhing an event as the revolution in France, the effects of which muſt neceſſarily have been felt in every quarter of the world, could not fail to alarm us as a neighbouring ſtate in an extraordinary degree. We trembled with the ſhock, which plunged ſo great a nation into anarchy, and watched with a dread anxiety on the brink of the fatal precipice, expecting the convulſion to ſubſide. When we ſaw the faction, which had produced the awful chaos, triumphing amidſt the ſpoil, and endeavouring to ſpread the havoc, a ſenſe of our own danger naturally induced us to look to the executive power of our country for protection. Our hope was not in vain. The wiſe precaution of our government to prevent the contagion of the pernicious principles, which threatened to involve this happy iſland in

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miſery and ruin, claimed our confidence, our warmeſt approbation, and our gratitude. The alarm, naturally raiſed in the breaſt of every honeſt Briton, jealous of the enjoyment of his rights, and rouzed to a ſenſe of his hazardous ſituation, was attended by the beſt effects. The love we bear our envied conſtitution, the veneration in which we hold our mild religion, and an attachment to our unrivalled domeſtic comforts, wakened all our feelings into action, and confirmed our reſolution to unite in their ſupport. For this purpoſe, the moſt reſpectable members of ſociety, not only in the metropolis, but in the parochial diſtricts of the moſt diſtant quarters of the kingdom, where an equal degree of zealous and diſintereſted patriotiſm, and loyalty to a gracious ſovereign, pervaded every rank of people, and the ſame cauſes for alarm produced the ſame neceſſity for caution, aſſociated to proteſt their country; to form a phalanx againſt its internal enemies; for, ſuch, alas, there are! and to guard againſt approaching evils by enforcing the laws againſt ſedition, removing the poiſon from the lips of the unwary by checking the propagation of deſtructive principles, and adopting every expedient and conſtitutional method to ſtrengthen the bulwark of our freedom. Thus we were ſecured from the impend-

ing danger; but, lulled by the idea of our ſafety, we ſlumbered not. We continued to ſurvey, not in a ſtate of lethargy and indifference, but with increaſing horror, the dæmons of ambition, revenge, and diſcord, furiouſly brandiſhing their deſtructive weapons. We marked the climax of the barbarity of a fallen and abandoned nation, until the murder of their innocent ſovereign ſtamped indelible diſgrace upon the name of France. Had the miſchief been confined within the borders of that diſtracted country, however juſtifiable Great Britain might have been for endeavouring to reconcile contending parties, and through her mediation to eſtabliſh a permanent conſtitution to enſure the peace of Europe, it was certainly the intention of the government of this country, as declared by the authority of the throne itſelf, to "obſerve a ſtrict neutra-"lity, and uniformly to abſtain from any in-"terference in the internal affairs of France." The characteriſtic follies of the French might have excited our ridicule, and their atrocious cruelties have provoked our juſt abhorrence; but the ſword would have ſtill remained unſheathed. We had formed no alliance with the powers at war with them, which obliged us to ſupport their meaſures. No miniſter

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from Great Britain had attended the convention at Pilnitz, nor did we ever, before the war, however our inclinations might have led us individually to wiſh ſucceſs to the Auſtrian and Pruſſian armies, countenance their conduct by any public act.

We knew too well, and ſet too high a value on the ſuperior advantages reſulting from our foreign commerce, the encouragement of our internal manufactures, the expediency of an œconomical attention to the concerns of finance, and the increaſe of our public revenue, to ſtrengthen the credit of our funds and reduce the national debt, to hazard an expenſive war without the preſſing call of dire neceſſity.—Contented with our own, it was not our wiſh to preſcribe a form of government to others. As volatile and capricious in the choice of their conſtitution as in their manners, the French might have changed their ſyſtem of government as often as the varying faſhions of their fantaſtic dreſſes. But, artful and ambitious in their public as frivolous and contemptible in their private conduct, not contented with the prevalence of their language and degenerated manners, they have arrogated to themſelves the right of giving laws to Europe,

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and have preſumed to inſiſt on the adoption of principles, or, to ſpeak with greater accuracy, a dereliction of all principles, in the government of every other country, in conformity with their own.

In open defiance of the law of nations, the faith of treaties, and the temperate conduct of neutral powers, the French have dared not only to treſpaſs in the moſt wanton manner beyond the boundaries of reaſon and juſtice, but to break down every barrier eſtabliſhed by ſociety, to prevent the encroachment of diſorder. The triumphs, which attended their armies, when hoſtilities commenced, and the pernicious principles, which they even yet continue openly to avow in the national convention, ſtruck at our exiſtence as an independent nation, and threatened deſtruction to every comfort we enjoy. The firſt principle of nature, therefore, ſelf-preſervation, loudly called for immediate and vigorous exertions to avert the blow.

To be an advocate for war in general, however the proſpect of conqueſt and honour may gratify the ambition and the pride of ſoldiers, is certainly very repugnant to the feelings of humanity.

humanity. If its calamities are not ſufficiently depicted in the page of hiſtory to make us ſhudder at the approach of ſo great an evil, the deep traces of its ravages are ſtill too viſible, even in the moſt cultivated countries, not to make us ſincerely deplore its cauſes, however neceſſary, and earneſtly wiſh that enmities might ceaſe, and the ſword be ſheathed for ever. If we weigh the advantages reſulting even from an ignominious peace with thoſe of a ſucceſsful war, we know that the former will preponderate; but, notwithſtanding this, it is certainly poſſible that inſtances may occur, where peace with all its ineſtimable bleſſings might expoſe a nation to more remote perhaps, but more tremendous evils.

A peace without ſecurity for its permanence, which only gives breath to an enemy to increaſe his ſtrength, or grants a truce, the interval of which may be employed in making preparations for more effective war, is preferring the greater evil to the leſſer. It is ſuffering a wound to heal upon the ſurface, whilſt the real diſorder ſpreads beneath, and endangers the life of the patient, which a ſeaſonable, although perhaps a painful operation might have effectually ſaved.

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Had it been poſſible for the miniſters of this country to have averted the calamities to be apprehended from a war; could ſecurity have been given to us for the future peace of Europe, for the ſafety of ourſelves, and our allies from open invaſion, and from inſidious attacks on our internal peace, we are ſatisfied that they would have neglected no juſtifiable means to accompliſh ſo deſirable an object. The declarations, made by the members of adminiſtration in both houſes of parliament to this effect, are ſufficient proofs of their pacific intentions; and, however the meaſures adopted to promote ſuch a negociation, as became the dignity of the Britiſh government, may have been cavilled at, and reprobated by their antagoniſts, poſterity will echo the voice of the majority of their contemporary countrymen, and attribute the enjoyment of the ineſtimable bleſſings tranſmitted to them, confirmed, ſtrengthened, and increaſed, to their wiſe and ſeaſonable precautions in the moment of impending danger.

It has been repeatedly aſſerted that the exiſting government of a country, whatever that may be, is the power with which every other nation is bound to treat, and that all the objects which are ſaid to have been the grounds of

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the preſent war of England with France, might eaſily have been accompliſhed, if this country had condeſcended to negociate with the executive council of France, which was as much entitled to receive a miniſter of Great Britain as the empire of Morocco, or the ſtate of Algiers. In both theſe inſtances, however, notwithſtanding the change of perſons, whether by violent or any other means, with which we can have no concern, the government itſelf remains, and the new Emperor or Dey continues to be the organ of his reſpective ſtate; whereas in France, ſo long as the preſent diſorders prevail, with whom are we to treat? The convention itſelf, when the war commenced, had not decided what conſtitution was moſt conſonant with the wiſhes of the people, or rather with their own individual intereſts. The miniſters who report to-day, are denounced to-morrow. Their generals are on one day honoured with the civic crown, and on another ſurrendered at their bar, and the inſtructions given to a perſon authorized to treat with one executive council might arrive when it exiſts no more. When we reflect for a moment on the perpetual changes, which have taken place in their boaſted ſyſtems, and the infamy of their moſt diſtinguiſhed characters,

the idea of the poſſibility of an effective negociation vaniſhes. We have ſeen the prevailing party of the firſt aſſembly driven into exile, and thoſe, who ſucceeded them, ſeeking refuge in the ſame hoſpitable aſylum, which received the objects of their vengeance. Their boaſted heroes of the morning have before night become the objects of their fury, and the victorious citizen Dumourier himſelf proſcribed. What reliance can be placed on their moſt ſolemn declarations? What have they ſworn, that they have not violated? Their proteſtation of renouncing conqueſt was followed by the decree of an offenſive war, and the penetration of their armies into all the adjacent countries. In a ſolemn decree of one aſſembly they inveſted the amiable and unfortunate Louis with the titles of *Reſtorer of Liberty*, and *the Father of his People*, and decorated him with the moſt ſplendid enſigns of royalty; in another they ſpoiled him of his honours, branded him with infamy, doomed him to cruel impriſonment, and afterwards to an ignominious death. With uplifted hands to heaven they ſwore to protect the nation, the law, and the king; and embrued thoſe guilty hands in their monarch's blood. How then could Great Britain credit their profeſſions, or be juſtified

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in concluding a treaty with one faction, which another might annul? How negociate with a nation of aſſaſſins? So long as even the ſhadow of a government exiſted, and M. Chauvelin was accredited by that government to negociate with ours, no meaſure was neglected, which had the moſt diſtant tendency to avert the ſtorm which had ſo long been gathering. Even after the king was depoſed, the miniſter from France was ſuffered to reſide in London at the very time, when there was every reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſeditious meetings were clandeſtinely holden at his houſe, and notorious emiſſaries encouraged, who were plotting the deſtruction of the country. The ambaſſador from England continued to reſide at Paris, till the king, to whom he was ſolely accredited, was deprived of his regal function; nor was it till after the horrid maſſacres of the 10th of Auguſt, that the government recalled him. That fatal day degraded the French beneath the rank of men. From that period they ceaſed to be entitled to the reſpect, which, as a foreign nation, they might otherwiſe have claimed with juſtice. But the laſt and blackeſt deed was yet to complete the meaſure of their guilt. The murder of their king was an act, which naturally excluded M. Chauvelin from having

having any farther official communication with our government. To have acknowledged a miniſter, accredited by an aſſembly guilty of ſo baſe a crime, would have been to conceal our abhorrence of their conduct. But, notwithſtanding that this execrable deed was not only publicly, but privately, lamented by every individual in the nation, it was not made a pretence for war. A door was yet left open, and opportunities afforded for explanation, and ſatisfaction for the national inſults we had experienced, to prevent an open rupture. The miniſter was ſtill acceſſible in London, and Lord Auckland permitted to receive any propoſals which the artful Dumourier might be inclined to make to him as the channel of communication at the Hague. Our ſuſpenſe however was not of long duration. France, conſcious of her guilt, invented frivolous, and even falſe pretences for the commencement of hoſtilities. The prohibition of the exportation of corn, and of the circulation of their aſſignats in this country, the alien bill, the increaſe of our armament, and other meaſures, which were thought expedient, and which, by the law of nations, we had an undoubted right to adopt for our own ſecurity, were alleged as the grounds of an embargo being laid on our ſhipping,

ſhipping, and ſoon afterwards of a public declaration of war, an act, which caſt the fatal dye, and put the general peace of Europe, and the fate of nations, to the iſſue of the ſword.

The war on the part of England is evidently founded on the inconteſtible principles of juſtice, policy, and neceſſity; to reſiſt the views of conqueſt, and aggrandizement entertained by France "at all times dangerous; but peculiarly ſo at the preſent period to the Britiſh nation." To preſerve our honour, by procuring ſatisfaction for the inſults offered to us, and keeping our faith with our allies; and, above all, to prevent the propagation of thoſe dreadful principles, the encouragement of which muſt inevitably have led to the deſtruction of our glorious conſtitution, and the violation of the moſt ſacred duties, which are utterly ſubverſive of the peace and good order of all civil ſociety, and have already threatened to involve this country in all the horrors of anarchy and inteſtine war.

Theſe are the principles on which the preſent war is founded, and which we ſhall find that

Iſaac Espinasse Esqr.

that every circumſtance ſince the commencement of hoſtilities has concurred to juſtify.

It is acknowledged to be "the duty of every member of the commonwealth of Europe to ſupport the eſtabliſhed ſyſtem of the balance, and diſtribution of power, among the independent ſovereignties, which actually ſubſiſt, and to prevent the aggrandizement of any ſtate, and eſpecially the moſt powerful at the expence of any other." It was the policy of our anceſtors ſo early as in the days of queen Elizabeth, when thoſe great ſtateſmen the lords Burleigh, Cecil, and Walſingham, ſaw the neceſſity of ſeparating the Netherlands from Spain, although the extenſive empire of France formed a barrier between them, and the family compact of the houſe of Bourbon did not then exiſt. One of the moſt grievous charges againſt Charles the Second, was his having betrayed our intereſts in Holland, by ſwerving from this ancient policy. The hiſtory of the reigns of king William and queen Ann, the latter of which was ſo much diſtinguiſhed by the victories of Marlborough, received its luſtre from an adherence to the ſame eſtabliſhed ſyſtem, which has been faithfully obſerved by our three ſucceeding monarchs, and has contributed

tributed in a great degree to our preſent national ſplendor.

That France has encroached upon this ſyſtem, to a very alarming degree, cannot be contradicted. Little penetration is neceſſary to ſee through the flimſy veil with which ſhe has vainly attempted to diſguiſe her views. What but motives of ambition to enlarge her empire could induce her to march her armies into the dominions of the king of Sardinia, to ſeize on Savoy and Nice, and reunite them as conquered countries in the form of an eighty-fourth department to her own republic. It is pretended indeed that the king of Sardinia was in arms, and leagued with the combined powers of Auſtria and Pruſſia againſt France, and that the armies entered the country in compliance with the will, and earneſt intreaties, of an oppreſſed and injured people. That Sardinia partook of the general alarm in common with the reſt of Europe, and feſt the neceſſity of arming in her own defence, is not denied; but who will preſume to reprobate a country for endeavouring to guard againſt invaſion? That power had certainly as great a right by the law of nations to increaſe its ſtanding army in a time of danger, as France herſelf to em-

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body the national guards, or complete the port of Cherbourg, when all Europe was at peace. The king had declared his neutrality; the entrance of the French army therefore was evidently an act of flagrant injuſtice, an infringement of the rights of nations, and ſolely with a view of conqueſt. The aſſertion, that the army entered in compliance with the will of the people, and that the change effected in the conſtitution of the country was not the reſult of arbitrary power, is too eaſily refuted by notorious facts. The primary aſſemblies were convened by a military order, and, ſo far from having a will of their own, the diſtreſſed inhabitants were compelled to chuſe a republican form of government; and a foreigner* was ſent to the department to be elected its repreſentative, whom the people had never ſeen, who had never ſet his foot before on the ſoil, and who, ſo far from having any knowledge of the intereſts of the country, could ſcarcely ſpeak its language. To the ſame ambitious motives we are under the neceſſity of attributing the ſeizure of Avignon and Venaiſſin, the dominions of the Pope, the poſſeſſion of which had been confirmed to his predeceſſors, as ſe-

* Joel Barlow, an American.

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cular princes by the repeated public acts of that very nation, which now unjuſtly tore them from his hands. What, but a view of adding conqueſt to conqueſt, fixed the ſtandard of their new republic in the electorate of Mayence, the biſhoprick of Liege, and other provinces of Germany, which they violently diſmembered from the empire, and in a part of which they actually eſtabliſhed, although providentially but for a ſhort period, their democratic ſyſtem, with an intention of erecting it into an eighty-fifth department? Their ſole pretext was that thoſe places had afforded an aſylum to, and alleviated the accumulating ſorrows of the diſtreſſed nobility, and clergy, whoſe property was unjuſtly confiſcated, and who were driven from their native ſoil to ſeek protection, and even the common neceſſaries of life, in foreign climes, for daring to profeſs the virtue of a loyal attachment to their rightful ſovereign, and a reverence for the religion of their fathers. Under the ſpecious maſk of friendſhip, and a generous wiſh to give freedom to a people, whom they artfully repreſented as oppreſſed by the galling yoke of tyranny, and groaning under deſpotiſm, the French armies marched triumphantly into Brabant; but alas! it was a triumph in which the unfortunate inha-

bitants had but little ſhare. The city of Bruſſels, it is true, was illuminated on the arrival of the victorious Dumourier; but by the troops quartered in the houſes of the frightened and diſtreſſed inhabitants. The fallacy of the report, which was ſo induſtriouſly circulated, that the French army was cheerfully received, has been ſince diſcovered by the joy, expreſſed on the return of the Auſtrians. In Brabant and Flanders likewiſe primary aſſemblies were invited to chuſe their form of government; but that form was already fixed, and forced on the trembling natives by an army ripe for ſlaughter. The conſtitution, which the Belgians ſo dearly cheriſhed, the *joyeuſe entrée*, which they valued as their *magna charta*, and which they had obtained after repeated ſtruggles as much againſt the intrigues of deſperate democracy, as the overt acts of deſpotiſm, was torn from them by that very power, which proffered them protection. Every ſacred and political inſtitution, which did not correſpond with their own wild and ridiculous theories, was forcibly deſtroyed. "New laws were promulged with the mouths of their cannon, and enforced with the dagger and the ſword *."

* Mr. Pitt's Speech.

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During this exertion of a power more arbitrary than Turkiſh deſpotiſm, to complete the whole, the tree of liberty was planted with a farcical ſolemnity; but, inſtead of the idol being worſhipped, it was found neceſſary to ſurround it with troops, to protect it from the fury of the populace.

The language of Chambon in the national convention, declaring that the natural boundaries of France were the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and the Ocean, which met with univerſal applauſe, ſufficiently betrayed their ambitious ſyſtem: and, had the execution of that ſyſtem been accompliſhed, what conſequences had we not to dread! In ſome paroxyſm of their phrenſy, intoxicated with the ſucceſs of their barbarous armies, whoſe return to the capital they dreaded, and which neceſſity has in a great meaſure hitherto obliged them to quarter in the countries, which they had overrun, we might have heard of a decree to make us even the object of their fury, and our now happy and independent iſland tributary to their new republic. The addition of a diſtrict of territory, containing more than three millions of inhabitants, upon the moſt moderate calculation, to an empire already the

largeſt, and the population of which is greater in proportion to its extent than that of any other nation in Europe, was too ſerious an event to be viewed with indifference even by the moſt diſtant powers. Were it poſſible even now to conjecture the failure of the preſent exertions of almoſt all Europe to check the growth of an evil, pregnant with ſuch important conſequences, what have we not to dread! The motions of ſuch a gigantic power, ſtrengthening by exerciſe, would naturally create an apprehenſion for the liberties, if not for the exiſtence, not only of this, but of every other nation.

From this view of the general danger, with which the aggrandizement of the French dominions appeared to threaten Europe, it was evidently the height of juſtice and policy, in the ſurrounding powers, to make an immediate and vigorous effort to check the evil in its growth.

It was not however general policy alone, which called for our vigilance and activity in ſo critical a ſituation of affairs. The conſideration of our vicinity to France, and the late attack upon Holland, the fatal effects of which the

the juſt interference of this country, by urging the Dutch to action, and co-operating with them, has happily averted, are more powerful than any other motives of political expediency. The danger of an increaſe of the maritime power of France is of far greater conſequence to the intereſts of Great Britain than any acceſſion to their force by land.

When we ſurvey the map of Europe, and obſerve the very inconſiderable ſpace occupied by this highly favoured iſland, and reflect on the immenſity of its wealth, and its political conſequence in the ſcale of nations, we are naturally ſurprized at ſo extraordinary a phænomenon. This ſurpriſe, however, vaniſhes from the mind of a philoſophical enquirer, who traces effects to their real cauſes, and properly eſtimates the value of the local advantages, ſo liberally afforded us by nature in the produce, not only of the ſurface of the ſoil, which is more than adequate to the wants of our healthy natives, but of the very bowels of the earth, and the convenience of our numerous ports. From theſe ſuperior advantages, the wiſdom of our legiſlators has not failed to profit. Our ports are crowded with veſſels, our manufactures exported to the moſt diſtant regions, and,

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in return for the produce of our labour, we receive every foreign article of convenience, and luxury. To our commerce, which extends from the frigid to the torrid zone, we owe our wealth, our conſequence, and every other advantage which we juſtly boaſt of. To our commerce we are indebted for our unrivalled dominion of the ſeas, and the frequent triumphs of our navy, and ſo long as we continue to enjoy our preſent ſuperiority, ſecured by our fleets, we may brave the inſidious or open attacks of every nation under heaven. But, if France had preſerved her conqueſts in the Netherlands, and Holland had become a prey either to her arms, or her intrigues with the anti-ſtadholderian party, the event would in all human probability have led to a total ſeparation of that power from the intereſts of Great Britain, the natural conſequence of which muſt have been that France would have acquired the aſſiſtance of the fleet of the Dutch republic, and have been enabled by means of the numerous ports which would have then been opened to her, to watch the motions of our fleets, and haraſs our commerce with impunity. Her maritime frontier would have extended through the whole ſea-line of Flanders, and the United Provinces with an uninterrupted chain of

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hoſtile or neutral ports immediately oppoſite to the Britiſh coaſt, which in the courſe of but a few years muſt inevitably have given her advantages, of which we have always conſidered it expedient, and have laboured for ages, to deprive her. The French fleet would thus have become too powerful for us to cope with, and Great Britain would not only have been deprived of a ſtrong and natural ally, but that very power might have been employed againſt us, whoſe friendſhip has always been conſidered of the moſt eſſential ſervice, but which, when at war with us, has always proved a moſt powerful addition to our enemies. Aware of the danger reſulting from the increaſe of the maritime power of France, it was always the policy of this country, till the peace of 1783, to ſtipulate in our treaties, that Dunkirk, the poſſeſſion of which has been diſputed by our anceſtors at the expence of much blood, and treaſure, ſhould remain unfortified. The demolition of its fortifications was made an eſſential article in the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713; in that of the Hague in 1717; in that of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748; and in the treaty of Paris in 1763. Notwithſtanding this, the French, aware of its importance, and not remarkable for their faithful adherence to treaties,

ties, have as often repaired the works towards the ſea, as they have been compelled by their enemies to deſtroy them. It has been conſidered as an object likewiſe to prevent the completion of the harbour of Cherbourg. In ſhort, the Engliſh have always kept a watch on the improvement of both thoſe places, on account of their particularly convenient ſituations, knowing that, on the ſlighteſt pretence for a diſpute, our veſſels muſt be immediately expoſed to capture, and our ſhores to ſudden invaſion, unleſs we conſtantly kept a ſufficient fleet in the channel, and were otherwiſe in a ſtate of preparation to reſiſt the force of ſo dangerous an enemy. Such being the alarming conſequences threatened by the ſucceſs of France, is it not the duty of patriotic Britons, who regard their national ſecurity, and their domeſtic comforts, to riſk even the calamities of war, to avert the impending evil?

The increaſing power of our natural enemies, therefore, was a ſufficient cauſe to juſtify our armament.—But Engliſhmen are not merely actuated by principles of policy. We are convinced of the juſtice of our cauſe, and feel that we have been inſulted as a nation, that the rights of our allies have been infringed,

ed, and that we have been called upon to vindicate our national honour, by revenging the injuries we have ſuſtained, and preſerving the faith of treaties, which we were pledged to maintain inviolate.

The decree of the national convention on the 19th of November, explained by that of the 15th of December, in which France declared her revolutionary power, and encouraged inſurrection in every country, which expreſſed a wiſh to change its government, although, in fact, they meant only the adoption of their own new ſyſtem, was an inſult to every nation in Europe, and naturally provoked our indignation. When we ſaw the deputies from obſcure and contemptible ſocieties, not only in London, but in provincial towns, and even villages, received as ambaſſadors from the Britiſh nation, perſons, who were condemned by our laws, admitted to the higheſt honours, and were threatened by an appeal to the opinion of a loyal people, who know no other repreſentative than their rightful ſovereign, or thoſe whom he appoints, we could not remain inſenſible to ſo groſs an inſult. The invaſion of rights, which England had engaged to guarantee in Brabant, and, above all, their

contempt of the ſtipulations of exiſting treaties by opening the Scheldt, the excluſive navigation of which the Dutch were juſtly entitled to, with the conſent of other powers, and which Great Britain was bound to ſecure to them, were injuries which it would have ill become the dignity of a great and independent nation to ſubmit to.

Whether the waters of a navigable river ought, in the nature of things, to be as common as the other elements to thoſe countries, whoſe ſhores they waſh, is a queſtion, which has already occupied the talents of a Mirabeau, Linguet, and various other ingenious and celebrated writers; but it requires no depth of argument to prove, that when a nation, entitled by nature to ſuch a privilege, has yielded it by agreement to the advantage of another, that that agreement is ſacred. The excluſive right of the Dutch to the navigation of the Scheldt has, ever ſince they gained their independence, been conſidered as an object of the firſt importance, not only to their commercial intereſts, but to their political exiſtence. When the point was in diſpute ſo long ago as the year 1402, it was determined that the ſafety and independence of the province of Zealand

land in particular, reſted on the enjoyment of that privilege, of which the French have now attempted to deprive the Republic, and in which, if this country had not taken an active part to prevent the accompliſhment of their deſigns, they would in all probability have ſucceeded.

Thoſe who are acquainted with the ſituation and other local circumſtances, as well as with the hiſtory, of the United Provinces, know that the Dutch are indebted to their induſtry and ſpirit of commerce, and not to any natural advantages, for their opulence and power, and that the foundation of their greatneſs is as artificial, as the piles on which the buildings are erected in their cities. Every thing, therefore, which tends to ſupport that ſurpriſing fabric, is of the utmoſt importance, not only to the Dutch themſelves, but ultimately to us as their allies.

The advantages, which this country as a maritime and commercial power derives from its alliance with the United Provinces, are too evident to inſiſt upon. Experience has confirmed the wiſdom of our anceſtors, who firſt thought ſo natural a connection eſſential to our intereſts; and it is the duty of our miniſters, ſo long as its

expediency continues to exiſt, to ſecure to this country every poſſible advantage it was intended to afford us, of courſe therefore to reſiſt every attempt which might eventually leſſen its validity.

It has been ſaid in parliament, that Great Britain was not called upon to act; that our interference therefore was officious, and that, by involving the Dutch in war, we brought the miſchief on ourſelves. But when we conſider the United Provinces as the weaker power, dreading an invaſion, and that an army was already preſſing on their borders, famiſhed, and almoſt naked, urged to action, not only by the enthuſiaſm of extravagant liberty, but by the want of common neceſſaries, and the hope of plunder, what efficient ſteps could they have purſued without us? There was no alternative, but ſubmiſſion to an enemy naturally intemperate, and become barbarous by circumſtances, or the immediate inundation of their country, a meaſure which they have never reſorted to but in the utmoſt danger, and which experience has taught them would retard the cultivation of the ſoil for a ſeries of years. In ſuch circumſtances it would indeed have been very unworthy of Great Britain, and very unlike her

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uſual conduct, to have waited for any ſolicitation.

I come now to the moſt important argument in favour of the neceſſity of the war, becauſe it comes home to the feelings of every individual in this country, who has any rights to value, or comforts to cheriſh. To prevent the propagation of thoſe pernicious principles, which lead to the violation of the moſt ſacred duties, and the ſubverſion of the peace and good order of civil ſociety; and to preſerve inviolate our glorious conſtitution, at once the pride and boaſt of Britons, which has been obtained by the ſtruggles of our anceſtors, is founded on experience, and has ſtood the teſt of ages.

Of the ineſtimable advantages of ſuch a conſtitution, France has invidiouſly attempted to deprive us. To adopt the language of our miniſter: "She viewed with a jealous eye our "happy ſituation, and the contraſt it bore to "the diſtracted ſtate of her own dominions. "She ſaw that the wiſe and happy mixture of "a monarchical government, not founded on "baſe ſuperſtition, but blended with a tempe-"rate ariſtocracy, and independent democracy,

"was

" was ſuperior to any that could poſſibly ariſe
" from her own viſionary projects. She ſaw
" with pain the inviolability of the ſovereign,
" the operation of the three eſtates, and the
" check of the laws. She ſaw that ſhe was ex-
" empt from this happineſs at home, where
" the experiments of tyranny, in affecting to
" eſtabliſh liberty, had been productive of ruin
" and confuſion. She ſaw, with an invidious
" eye, the geographical ſituation of this happy
" iſland, where neither the rigour of the
" polar froſt, nor ſcorching beams of the torrid
" zone, either checked the fruits of the earth,
" or enervated her natives. She ſaw with jea-
" louſy, that the climate was congenial to all
" the fruits of a fertile ſoil, and that ſhe was
" equally a ſtranger to peſtilence and famine,
" as to the convulſions of an earthquake! Thus
" ſhe found, that we made a ſplendid contraſt
" to that unhappy country, which theory,
" and impracticable ſpeculations, in a thouſand
" ſhapes, has reduced to the loweſt ebb of
" miſery and misfortunes *."

France ſaw our happineſs, and ſickened at the view. She was reſtleſs till ſhe made an in-

* Mr. Pitt's ſpeech, February 1.

fidious

ſidious attempt to undermine it, by promulging the doctrines to which ſhe was indebted for her own misfortunes, and to blaſt all our comforts with the infectious breath of ſedition. Hence the hoſt of emiſſaries, and agents, which for a length of time infeſted the ſtreets of the metropolis, and who, conſcious of the detection of their views, ſuddenly diſappeared before the operation of the alien bill. Hence the attempts to debauch our army, the inſtigation and encouragement of inſurrections, and the miſrepreſentation of facts in ſocieties eſtabliſhed for licentious debate, in coffee-houſes, and even in common ale-houſes, to ſeduce thoſe who were vile or weak enough to adopt French principles from their allegiance to the government. Hence the ſudden and rapid circulation of their aſſignats, and the offices, which were eſtabliſhed in London to exchange them, to reward the hirelings employed in laying a train for exploſion, when the plot was ſufficiently matured. Hence the increaſe of ſeditious clubs among the lower orders of the people, which, although now ſhrunk from their purpoſe, were eſtabliſhed, not only in every quarter of London and Edinburgh, and the manufacturing towns of Birmingham, Norwich, Mancheſter, and Sheffield, but in the obſcureſt villages,

villages, and remoteſt corners of the iſland; the ſudden and univerſal panegyrics on republicaniſm, and abuſe of the exiſting government, the calumniation of its excellent qualities, and exaggeration of its defects, not merely in volumes and pamphlets, which were delivered gratis, but through the more diffuſive channels of daily news-papers, and hand-bills diſtributed in the moſt frequented ſtreets, and affixed in the moſt conſpicuous places, to attract the notice of the populace; in ſhort, to diffuſe the poiſon in every ſhape and form, "to weaken the "bands by which the government and people "are connected, to diminiſh the authority of "the laws, to remove the ramparts which are "neceſſary to controul the paſſions of mankind, "and to ſacrifice our domeſtic tranquillity, and "national proſperity, for the horrors of inteſ-"tine broils and civil diſcord." Such have been the attempts of vile incendiaries, who aimed at a general conflagration to profit from the ſpoil, and inſinuated that there was ſomething rotten in the ſtate, with the ſole intention "to cry havoc, and let ſlip the dogs of war."

If theſe attempts to deſtroy our happineſs, by ſtabbing at the vitals of our conſtitution, and promoting an oppoſition to the exiſting govern-

ment,

ment, did not originate with, it is too evident that they were countenanced by our foreign enemies. The language of the French national convention has been a virtual declaration of war againſt every eſtabliſhed government in Europe. The ſtandard of ſedition has been erected, every poſſible temptation has been held out to allure the enemies of peace and good order, and anathamas thundered againſt all infidels, who ſhould refuſe to rally, and ſupport it. If there is not ſufficient reaſon to ſuſpect that emiſſaries from France were concerned in the riots, which a ſhort time ſince took place at Shields, at Leith, Yarmouth, Perth, Dundee, and in ſeveral other towns, where the pretext was, that they aroſe merely amongſt the ſailors, who demanded an increaſe of wages; facts have been diſcovered, which warrant the aſſertion, that diſaffected perſons have not been wanting, to inſtigate and foment diſturbances, in various parts of the country. The late arreſt of a French engineer, and an aid du camp of Dumourier himſelf, who were found in arms in Ireland, are proofs that this aſſertion is not wholly groundleſs.

It is no longer a ſecret from the public, that government has thought it neceſſary to order

ſome hundred French, who were ſuſpected of villanous intentions, to quit the country at a ſhort notice, ſince the operation of the alien bill, that the importation of arms has been ſeaſonably prevented, and orders for the manufacture of hoſtile weapons, apparently deſigned for the clandeſtine purpoſes of French aſſaſſins, diſcovered and ſtopped before the dreadful plot was ripe for execution. Other circumſtances likewiſe have occurred, which could not fail to alarm every well-wiſher to his country. The nocturnal meetings at the houſe of the late French miniſter, regularly frequented by notoriouſly ſuſpected perſons, and the viſits of an acknowledged principal, although not oſtenſible, agent of the French republic, to the interior parts of England; the correſpondence, likewiſe, conſtantly kept up, with unconſtitutional and ſeditious ſocieties, in various parts of Great Britain and Ireland, and the detection of known aſſaſſins, who were found ſculking in the obſcureſt parts of London, are indiſputable facts. Amongſt theſe aſſaſſins was diſcovered that infamous wretch Rotondi, who it is ſaid had the audacity to boaſt, in a public coffee-room, that he had maſſacred, on the 10th of Auguſt, no leſs a number than twenty of his unhappy countrymen, with the ſame guilty

guilty hand that had been ſtained with the innocent blood of the accompliſhed princeſs de Lamballe. This bareſaced villain dared to parade the ſtreets of the metropolis with his accomplices; and yet the advocates for the principles, maintained and propagated by his employers, preſume to tell us, that our country was not in danger, and that a war with France is inexpedient and unjuſt!

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Through the conſtant vigilance, and the wiſe precautions of the executive power, the dreadful ſtorm, which threatened to burſt upon our heads, and pour deſtruction on our happineſs, has been moſt ſeaſonably averted. The gloomy cloud has paſſed over us, and the danger, which but a ſhort time ſince we ſaw ourſelves expoſed to, has inſpired us with a determined zeal, and unanimous reſolution to guard in future againſt the evils, we have ſo narrowly eſcaped.

Upon theſe principles we juſtify the war we are engaged in: and when we reflect that it is not merely to preſerve our national honour or for the ſake of conqueſt; that it is not ſolely to defend our political conſequence in Europe, or that of our allies; but that the intereſt of

every individual is immediately concerned; that it is *pro aris et focis*, for every comfort which we now enjoy, and which we hope to tranſmit to our children's children, no patriotic Briton can heſitate a ſingle moment to aſſent to its vigorous proſecution. All that is near and dear to us is at ſtake, and it is our duty to hazard our lives and fortunes to perpetuate the enjoyment of thoſe bleſſings on which we ſet ſo high a value.

It is evident, from the circumſtances already mentioned, that the war with France originated with that power; and that, on the part of England, it is founded on juſtice, policy, and neceſſity. It is equally evident, likewiſe, that the advantages, which we reaſonably expect to derive from our ſucceſs, are not merely the phantoms of imagination, but real, and that the effects produced by them in all probability will be permanent. The preſervation of our political exiſtence, as a great and independent nation, and our internal tranquillity, as well as the independence and general welfare of our natural allies; the evacuation of the Auſtrian Netherlands, which the combined armies have already happily accompliſhed, the evacuation of the countries contiguous to the

the Rhine, and the reſtoration of Savoy and Nice; to reduce the power of the French to certain limits, and to eſtabliſh ſome ſettled form of government, as a ſecurity for a laſting peace to Europe, are objects of the firſt importance, and which certainly demand our utmoſt exertions to attain.

The probability of thoſe exertions being eventually crowned with ſucceſs, is certainly much greater than the advocates for France, and French principles, have induſtriouſly repreſented it. Notwithſtanding the boaſted reſources, which Briſſot, Kerſaint and other enthuſiaſtic members of the national convention, whoſe intereſt it is to exaggerate, and ſwell the amount of the number of their troops, and the ſecurity for their aſſignats, have repreſented as inexhauſtible, we ſhall find on calm enquiry, ſuppoſing even the number of their forces to be accurate, and the report of their general military ſtrength to be founded on facts, that in the preſent ſtate of circumſtances we have no reaſonable cauſe to be alarmed. If we may judge from the accumulated diſtreſſes which afflict the inhabitants of France at preſent, no extraordinary ſpirit of prophecy is requiſite to predict an increaſe of

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ſtill more horrible calamities to complete their miſery. Allowing a population of five and twenty millions, which is ſaid to have been the moſt accurate calculation of the number of inhabitants in the French dominions, before the addition of the new departments, their military force muſt neceſſarily far exceed the powers of the country. According to the uſual calculation of the proportion of males to females, as twelve to thirteen; of children to men of mature age, as three to one; and of the aged and infirm, to the hale and ſtrong, who are capable of bearing arms, and of employments of a laborious kind in the dock-yards, various manufactories, and branches of agriculture, as two to one; the number of the latter will only amount to ſomewhat more than two millions, or a twelfth part of all the inhabitants. Of theſe according to a decree paſſed in the national convention, at the commencement of hoſtilities, five hundred and ſixty thouſand effective men have been ordered for the land ſervice, and ſixty thouſand more to equip their navy, ſo that the total number of able labourers and artificers remaining cannot exceed fifteen hundred thouſand altogether. This number is far from being adequate to the labour required to ſupply the common neceſ-

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ſaries of clothing and proviſions; not to mention the prodigious troops of emigrants, who have ſought protection in other countries, thoſe, who are able, but unaccuſtomed, to work at home, the indolent, who have followed the armies to the frontiers, and even to the ſcene of action in hoſtile territories, to ſhare the proviſion deſtined for the regular troops, or with the hope of plunder, and the crowds of wretched victims to the inclemency of the ſeaſon and the fate of war. The natural conſequence of this muſt be the decreaſe of population, the neglect of agriculture and manufactures, the deſtruction of commercial credit, a general diſſatisfaction among the lower orders of the people, which has already been fatally experienced, and ultimately a want of confidence, if not a revolt in the armies deſtined to oppoſe us, a circumſtance, which may eventually render them an eaſy conqueſt to the veteran and well-diſciplined troops of the powers at war with them, whom the remembrance of former glories muſt inſpire with courage, and firmneſs. Another circumſtance which muſt naturally tend to increaſe our proſpect of ſucceſs, is the dreadful want of proviſions, which is ſaid to have prevailed to ſo great a degree at Paris, and in other populous towns, as almoſt to have produced a famine; in the former place amongſt the

the lower claſſes of people, who were totally dependent on the bounty of the nobility, and clergy, maintained in their ſervice, or contributed by their labour to ſupply their luxuries, and in the latter amongſt the manufacturers out of employ.

According to the moſt authentic accounts of the preſent ſtate of France, the credit of the trader is deſtroyed, the looms remain inactive, the vines unpruned, and agriculture in general is almoſt totally neglected, or entruſted either to the care of the aged, and infirm, or to women and children, who are unequal to the toil; whilſt the inefficacy of the executive government, to reſtrain the abandoned part of the inhabitants from pillage and wanton maſſacres, haſtens to complete the ruin of that wretched country. We have heard of the immenſe funds which have been raiſed to proſecute their military operations, from the ſale of the confiſcated eſtates of the clergy and emigrant nobility; but in the preſent ſtate of that diſtracted country, however the prodigious amount of the value of thoſe eſtates may give an apparent and a plauſible ſecurity to their aſſignats, where are purchaſers to be met with? The uncertainty of the tenure, the ſcarcity of ſpecie, the greateſt

part

part of which has been privately tranſmitted to other countries; and the late act of parliament, which has paſſed in this country, to put an end to a ſpeculation ſo favourable to our enemies, muſt have conſiderably reduced their value. All theſe circumſtances muſt certainly tend to increaſe the diſcontent, which has already begun to prevail in ſeveral of the departments againſt the ruling faction, and, if they do not immediately produce a counter-revolution, will probably increaſe the internal commotions and diſſentions, weaken the power of the country in general, and drive the inhabitants to the alternative of ſubmitting to ſuperior force, or of deſtroying each other by the moſt dreadful of all calamities, a civil and inteſtine war.

The unexampled combination of Ruſſia and Spain, acting in concert with the Germanic empire, in its collective capacity, Auſtria, Pruſſia, and the maritime powers of England and Holland, will probably render the war of ſhort duration. The deciſive victories already gained in Brabant, and on the Rhine, encourage our ſanguine hopes, that they are the forerunners of greater triumphs. Our fleet co-operating with that of Spain, and now perhaps of Naples, muſt neceſſarily deſtroy

the trade of France in the Mediterranean, and the fortreſſes of Gibraltar and Ceuta, which command the Streights, prevent any ſupply of corn, or other proviſions, and warlike ſtores, from any other quarter. A Britiſh and Dutch fleet will command the channel, while the Ruſſians effectually prevent any communication with the Baltic.

It has been repeatedly urged in oppoſition to the war, that it muſt inevitably be attended with fatal conſequences to the commercial world. That the calamities of war ſhould be the occaſion of misfortune to individuals, is certainly much to be lamented; but, upon the moſt ſerious and impartial conſideration it does not appear that they are likely to be ſo prejudicial to our mercantile intereſts as might at firſt have been reaſonably apprehended.

The commercial treaty, concluded with France in the year 1786, has certainly been by no means ſo favourable to the manufacturers of this country, as has been generally ſuppoſed, and for a very obvious reaſon. When that treaty was concluded, the immediate advantages expected to be derived from it, were ſo flattering to the ſpeculative trader, that a much

much greater quantity of articles, the produce of Great Britain, was forced upon the market, than the conſumption warranted. The market was over-ſtocked, and the dealers reduced to the ſad alternative of either ſubmitting to a trifling profit, and giving credit for a greater length of time than their capitals would allow, or having the goods returned upon their hands, without the power of diſpoſing of them at the markets of other countries, except at a conſiderable loſs, on account of the expence of carriage, and various other circumſtances; ſo that the cottons of Scotland and Mancheſter, the cloths of Yorkſhire and Devonſhire, and many articles of hardware from Sheffield and Birmingham were ſold, before the war in France, even at a leſs price than they could be purchaſed for in England. Our trade to other countries, on the contrary, and particularly to Germany, and the Baltic, although the quantity of goods exported is certainly far from being equal, is much more lucrative and beneficial, as the prices are conſiderably higher, and the payment, if not immediate, at a very ſhort credit. The war will certainly operate in favour of our trade to Ruſſia, in particular, which has always been conſidered by the ableſt politicians as of the firſt importance, both with

reſpect to the variety of our manufactures, which are exported, and the uſeful, and even neceſſary articles, which we receive in return, to ſupply the wants of our navy. "It has been conſidered likewiſe as eſſential to our national intereſt, as it tends to increaſe the number of our ſeamen, and as thoſe ſeas are beſt calculated to harden, and render them fit for the ſevereſt ſervice." The Ruſſians are growing daily more luxurious, and have ever diſcovered a partiality to trade with England, which, if properly encouraged, muſt certainly be attended with the moſt beneficial conſequences to our maritime and commercial intereſts. It is not, however, our trade to Ruſſia and other northern countries alone by which we may reaſonably expect to be benefited. The decline of the trade and manufactures of France affords the merchants of this country a favourable opportunity of recovering the valuable trade of the Levant. This branch of commerce once ſo profitable, on account of the demand which it cauſed for our manufactures, has been for many years of no great importance, the Southern parts of France having availed themſelves of the advantages their ſituation afforded them, to underſel us in all the Turkiſh ports. The trade of America likewiſe,

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of which a conſiderable ſhare was transferred from this country to Nantz, Havre de Grace, and other ports of France, when the United States acquired their independence, may reaſonably be expected to make no inconſiderable addition to our preſent flouriſhing revenue.

It muſt certainly be acknowledged, that, ſince the commencement of the war, the Gazette has announced an unuſual number of failures in the commercial world, which has materially ſhaken the credit of individuals, a circumſtance, of which thoſe who view only the dark ſide of things, have not failed to take advantage, to calumniate the miniſter, and reprobate his meaſures. If we examine the facts, however, as they really exiſt, we ſhall find that many of thoſe, who have lately ſtopped payment, or actually become bankrupts, and particularly the country bankers, have had little connexion with foreign commerce, and that their misfortunes, if ſuch they may be called to the country at large, have been generally the reſult of ſpeculations, too extenſive for their capitals. Excepting a few inſtances of gentlemen of landed property who have been allured into the faſcinating gulph by the proſpect of ſudden gain, the greater part

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of them have had no other foundation than the credit of their firms, and ſo far from their failures being a matter of ſurpriſe to the ſteady and ſubſtantial traders, it is only to be attributed to the peculiar circumſtances of the times, that they ſhould have been able to ſupport themſelves ſo long.

The failure of ſome of theſe houſes naturally created a general alarm. The ſudden panic, which univerſally prevailed, prevented an inquiry into the ſecurity of the bills in circulation, the inevitable conſequence of which was, that a larger quantity of them was immediately poured even into the well-eſtabliſhed banks, than their funds were immediately equal to, and this increaſed the demand of ſpecie to ſo great a degree, that ſome of the moſt wealthy houſes, which are known to be poſſeſſed of property to an immenſe amount, were unable to raiſe an adequate ſupply, and trembled with the general ſhock.

After all, perhaps, the failure of the country banks in general, ſo far from proving an actual evil, although many innocent individuals may be ſufferers, will ultimately be found to be a real national advantage. The

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plan lately adopted by the Bank of England, of iſſuing notes for ſmaller ſums will certainly ſupply their convenience to the farmers and inferior tradeſmen, to whom the country banks were chiefly an advantage; and the credit of the opulent merchants will be materially ſuſtained, as well as confidence reſtored by the aid of the exchequer bills.

What this country may eventually gain by the war, beſides the general advantage in which all Europe muſt participate, it is impoſſible preciſely to determine. Circumſtances have hitherto occurred ſo contrary to the general expectation, that it is ſcarcely poſſible to hazard a conjecture on the ſubject. Reaſoning, however, from favourable appearances, and the ſucceſs, which has hitherto attended the meaſures adopted, we may venture to predict that our object will ſoon be happily accompliſhed. It is poſſible alſo that our expences may be reimburſed by the acquiſition of the French poſſeſſions, not only in the Eaſt-Indies, which muſt inevitably fall an eaſy prey to us; but of the Weſt-India iſlands themſelves, which are certainly already in a ſtate of revolt, and it is ſaid have ſolicited the protection of Great Britain againſt the new republic. The iſland

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of Corfica in the Mediterranean, would be a conquest attended with little hazard, and by supplying us with a port in that sea, be an object of great importance to us.

Various other advantages might eaſily be mentioned, which may contribute in a conſiderable degree to counterbalance whatever loſſes, even a long and expenſive war might expoſe us to. But whether this were the caſe or not, we are ſenſible that the cauſe we are engaged in, is of ſuch importance, that every good citizen will chearfully conſent to ſacrifice his private and temporary intereſt however great, in its ſupport. We are convinced, that a war with France is the only meaſure by which we can ſecure the preſervation of our liberties, our property, and every advantage we enjoy, which is a ſufficient inducement to proſecute it with unanimity and vigour.

FINIS.